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Abstract
Scientifically valid instruments are being used for the first time to assess
an individual’s risk of violence in criminal sentencing and in the civil
commitment of mental patients and sexual predators. Risk factors on these
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instruments pertain to what the person is (e.g., gender), what the person has (e.g.,
personality disorder), what the person has done (e.g., past violence), and what has
been done to the person (e.g., past victimization). In this Article, I argue that in
criminal law, with its emphasis on blameworthiness for actions taken, the
admissibility of scientifically valid risk factors is properly constrained to those
that simultaneously index moral blameworthiness, i.e., to the defendant’s prior
criminal conduct. In contrast, the civil commitment of people with mental
disorder—a determination in which moral blameworthiness plays no part—should
not constrain the admissibility of violence risk factors, except for those subject to
strict Equal Protection scrutiny.
Finally, in the commitment of sexually violent predators, courts should
keep evidentiary issues about the admissibility of violence risk factors apart from
substantive questions about the constitutionality of the statutes that trigger risk
assessment. If commitment as a sexually violent predator is properly categorized
as civil commitment, the admissibility of violence risk factors in implementing
such commitments should parallel the admissibility of violence risk factors in the
civil commitment of mental patients. Disagreement with the substantive merits of
sexually violent predator statutes does not justify depriving decision makers of the
only kind of scientific evidence—empirically-validated actuarial violence risk
assessment—that can effectuate their statutory goals.
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At the penalty hearing of Victor Saldano’s capital murder case, a Texas
jury was made to answer the statutory question of whether the defendant, if not
executed, “would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.”2 The state introduced as a scientific expert witness a
psychologist who found that Saldano possessed many risk factors for violence,
among them his Hispanic ethnicity, which the expert testified was “a factor
weighing in favor of future dangerousness.”3 The jury sentenced the defendant to
death, and, after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the sentence,4
Saldano successfully petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
He argued that the use of race or ethnicity for assessing violence risk violated the
Equal Protection Clause.5
In its response to the defendant’s federal petition, the state—which had
vigorously pursued the death penalty in Texas courts—had a dramatic change of

2. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(B)(1) (Vernon 2002). The statute was upheld in
Barefoot v Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
3. The same expert offered similar testimony regarding race or ethnicity as a risk factor for
violence in eight other cases in Texas. See Press Release, John Cornyn, Attorney General, Texas,
Statement Regarding Death Penalty Cases (June 9, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cornyn
Press Release].
4. Saldano v. State, No. 72,556 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999).
5. “The question for review was, ‘Whether a defendant’s race or ethnic background may ever be
used as an aggravating circumstance in the punishment phase of a capital murder trail in which the
State seeks the death penalty.’” Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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heart. On the eve of oral argument, then-Attorney General John Cornyn6
conceded to the Court that “because the use of race in Saldano’s sentencing
seriously undermined the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
process, Texas confesses error and agrees that Saldano is entitled to a new
sentencing hearing.”7 Then-Governor George W. Bush praised his Attorney
General’s confession of error as “an indication that there are safeguards in the
system.”8 Codifying the Attorney General’s revised position, the legislature
passed, and a new Governor9 signed, an amendment to the Texas Code of

6. Attorney General Cornyn was elected to the United States Senate in November 2002.
7. Cornyn Press Release, supra note 2. Accordingly, the U. S. Supreme Court vacated the
judgment. Saldano v Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that since Saldano’s counsel did not object to the
psychologist’s testimony at trial, the issue could not be presented on appeal. The death sentence,
therefore, was upheld. Saldano , 70 S.W.3d at 875. Saldano then filed a motion for a writ of
habeas corpus with the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. In May, 2002, Texas
Attorney General Cornyn confessed error to this court. The following month, the District
Attorney of Collin County, Texas – whose office was responsible for the original prosecution of
Victor Saldano – filed a motion to intervene in the case, seeking to have the death penalty upheld
over the Attorney General’s objection. On July 16, 2002, the district court held that the District
Attorney’s application for intervention presented a non-justiciable political question. The District
Attorney appealed this decision. The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s finding of nonjusticiablity and remanded the District Attorney’s case to the district court “for disposition on the
merits.” Saldano v O'Connell, 322 F. 3d 365 (5th Cir. 2002). The District Court denied the District
Attorney’s motion to intervene, but granted Saldano’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Saldano
v. Cockrell, 267 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Tex. 2003). The District Court ordered the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice “to release Saldano from custody unless the State of Texas, within
180 days from the date of entry of this order and judgment, either commences a new punishment
hearing or reforms his sentence to life imprisonment.” Id. at 645. The District Attorney appealed
the District Court’s order to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court’s order. Saldano v.
Roach, 363 F.3d 545 (Fifth Cir. 2004).
8. Associated Press, Bush Comments on Death Row Case, Washington Post, June 6, 2000.
9. Rick Perry had assumed the governorship of Texas when George W. Bush resigned that
position after being elected President of the United States.
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Criminal Procedure stating: “Evidence may not be offered by the state to establish
that the race or ethnicity of the defendant makes it likely that the defendant will
engage in future criminal conduct.”10
Debate about what risk factors for future violence constitute admissible
evidence in court is not limited to Texas or to capital punishment hearings. It is
occurring throughout the country—indeed, throughout the world11—and for a
variety of legal purposes. This Article explores the contexts in which violence
risk assessments are being introduced as scientific evidence, reviews the risk
factors for violence that social science research has validated, and addresses the
admissibility of using given risk factors for specific legal purposes.
In Part I, I describe developments in substantive law that have amplified
the salience of violence risk assessment. Despite their notoriety in cases such as
Saldano, forward-looking risk assessments of future violence in criminal
sentencing have been deemphasized for the past two decades in favor of
backward-looking procedures designed to assess blameworthiness for past
conduct. Most of the recent developments implicating violence risk assessment
have been civil rather than criminal in nature. By playing on exaggerated public

10. Admissibility in a Criminal Trial of Race or Ethnicity As a Predictor of Future Criminal
Behavior, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(3)(a)(2) (Vernon 2002) (effective Sept. 1,
2001).
11. See, e.g., SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (Michael Tonry & Richard
Frase eds., 2001).
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fear of violence by people with mental disorder, treatment advocates have been
successful in loosening legal strictures on commitment to mental hospitals for
those found to be “dangerous to others.”12 For the first time, these same
advocates also have been successful in creating in many states legally enforceable
commitment to outpatient treatment in the community. In addition, the United
States Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Hendricks13 and Kansas v Crane,14 has upheld
sexually violent predator statutes, providing for the post-imprisonment civil
commitment of sex offenders who have a “mental abnormality”—but not a major
mental disorder, such as schizophrenia—which results in their becoming “likely
to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.” 15
Alongside these developments in the law have been developments in the
science of violence forecasting.16 I consider these in Part II. For fifty years,
behavioral scientists have known in theory that actuarial (sometimes called
statistical) risk assessment is far more accurate than reliance on unstructured

12. See, for example, Oregon Revised Statute 426.130.
13. 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
14. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, art. 29A (2001).
16. The analogy between forecasting harmful weather and “forecasting” harmful behavior is
explored in John Monahan and Henry Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People: How
Meteorology Can Inform Risk Communication in Mental Health Law. 51 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST 931 (1996).
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professional judgment in predicting a wide variety of outcomes. But instruments
for implementing this knowledge in the context of assessing risk of violence had
not been developed. In the past several years, however, a number of actuarial
violence risk assessment tools have become widely available. The best known of
these instruments, and risk factors common to many of them, are considered here.
In Part III, I address the admissibility in various criminal and civil law
contexts of the scientifically valid risk factors for violence described in Part II. In
criminal law, with its emphasis on blameworthiness for past actions, I argue that
the admissibility of violence risk factors in sentencing is properly constrained to
those that index the extent or seriousness of the defendant’s prior criminal
conduct. In contrast, law authorizing the civil commitment of people with serious
mental disorder to inpatient or outpatient treatment involves a legal determination
about future conduct in which blameworthiness for past conduct plays no part. I
contend, therefore, that the admissibility of violence risk factors in civil
commitment can be unconstrained except for classifications subject to strict Equal
Protection scrutiny, which in the case of violence risk assessment is limited to the
individual’s race or ethnicity. Finally, if commitment as a sexually violent
predator is properly categorized as civil commitment, as the Supreme Court twice
has held, I argue that the admissibility of violence risk factors in effectuating such
commitments should parallel the use of violence risk factors in traditional civil
commitment: any risk factor that validly forecasts violence—with the single
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exception of race or ethnicity—is a legitimatecandidate for inclusion on actuarial
risk assessment instruments.

PART I: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF VIOLENCE RISK
ASSESSMENT

In recent years, developments regarding violence risk assessment have
taken place in three legal contexts: criminal sentencing, the civil commitment of
people with serious mental disorder, and the commitment of sexually violent
predators. Different legal and policy concerns have led reliance on violence risk
assessment to ebb in the first of these contexts and to flow in the second and third.

A. Criminal sentencing.

The federal Sentencing Commission,17 created by the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984,18 confronted what it referred to as a “philosophical problem”19 when
it set out to draft guidelines for use in sentencing convicted offenders. The
problem had to do with determining “the purposes of criminal punishment.”

17. See 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 991 (2002).
18. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3551 (2002).
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Some argue that appropriate punishment should be defined primarily on
the basis of the principle of “just deserts.” Under this principle,
punishment should be scaled to the offender’s culpability and the resulting
harms. Others argue that punishment should be imposed primarily on the
basis of practical “crime control” considerations. This theory calls for
sentences that most effectively lessen the likelihood of future crime, either
by deterring others or incapacitating the defendant.20
Assessing the likelihood of future crime is irrelevant to sentencing under
the backward-looking principle of punishment as just deserts, but is a central task
of sentencing under the forward-looking principle of crime control. Yet in the
view of the Commission, choosing between these two fundamental principles of
punishment was unnecessary, “because in most sentencing decisions, the
application of either philosophy will produce the same or similar results.”21 This

19. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (2000).
20. Id.
21. Id. See also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15 (1988) (referring to this “important
compromise.”). But see Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1438-41 (2001) (“Dangerousness and
desert are distinct criteria that commonly diverge... [T]hey inevitably distribute liability and
punishment differently. To advance one, the system must sacrifice the other.”). The separation of
desert-based from consequence-based justifications for state intervention has been a major theme
in the work of Stephen Morse. See Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, B. U.
L. REV. 113 (1996); Neither Desert Nor Disease, LEGAL THEORY 265 (1999); Uncontrollable
Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA L REV 1025 (2002). See also Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing
the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 52 EMORY LAW
JOURNAL 557 (2003); Paul Hofer and Mark Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding
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brief and facile treatment issued in 1987 has been the Commission’s first and last
word on the purposes of criminal punishment.
While theoretically agnostic about why we punish, the Sentencing
Guidelines22 promulgated by the Commission were remarkably explicit on how
we punish: race, sex, religion, national origin, socioeconomic status, and a
disadvantaged upbringing “are not relevant” in the determination of a sentence.23
In addition, education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties,

and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003).

22. In Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (decided June 24, 2004), the United States Supreme
Court held that a Washington State trial court’s imposition of an “exceptional sentence,” above the
standard maximum sentence, on the basis of the judge’s—rather than the jury’s—finding that the
defendant had acted with “deliberate cruelty” violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury. Justice Scalia, writing for the five-person majority, stated that “The Federal
[Sentencing] Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.” Id at 2538.
Justice O’Connor, dissenting, believed otherwise: “The court ignores the havoc it is about to
wreak on trial courts across the country. It is no answer to say that today’s opinion impacts only
Washington’s scheme and not others, such as, for example, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines…What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sentencing reform
are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeopardy.” Id at 2249-50. Since
June, several lower federal courts have ruled that the reasoning in Blakeley applies to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Ameline, No. 02-30326, 2004 WL 1635808 (9th Cir. Jul 21, 2004). In July the Acting
Solicitor General filed a certiorari petition stating that "The result [of Blakeley] has been a wave
of instability in the federal sentencing system that has left the government, defendants, and the
courts without clear guidance on how to conduct the thousands of federal criminal sentencings that
are scheduled each month." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, United States v. Booker, No. 04104 (July, 2004). In response, the Supreme Court has added Booker and another case to its docket
for the first day of oral argument in the October 2004 term. Booker, supra, cert. granted, 73
U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004) (No. 04-104); United States v. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114 (D.
Me. June 28, 2004), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004) (No. 04-105).
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4H1.10 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The
Sentencing Reform Act directed that the Guidelines be “entirely neutral” with respect to race, sex,
religion, national origin, and socioeconomic status. The Commission responded by adopting a
Policy Statement that listed the above factors -- plus an additional one of “a disadvantaged
upbringing.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2002).
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community ties, age, mental and emotional condition, and substance abuse, are
“not ordinarily relevant” in the determination of a sentence.24 As Professor Kate
Stith and Judge Jose Cabranes note, “the Commission has never explained why it
chose to exclude a variety of factors (especially those relating to the personal
history of the defendant) from the sentencing calculus.”25
With the single exception of criminal history—which the Guidelines state
“is relevant in determining the appropriate sentence”26—virtually all of the
variables that potentially could be used as scientifically valid risk factors for
violence27 under a forward-looking consequentialist “crime control” theory of

24. U.S.S.G., supra note 18, §§ 4H1.1-.6. While not “ordinarily” relevant, the noted factors may
sometimes be relevant. Examples given in the Guidelines Manual include the misuse of special
training or education to facilitate criminal activity, which is permitted to aggravate sentence
length. While some factors may not ordinarily be relevant in the sense that they are not to be used
in determining the length of imprisonment, they may be used for other purposes. Thus, the
Guidelines Manual states:
Substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime. Due to
this increased risk, it is highly recommended that a defendant who is incarcerated also be
sentenced to supervised release with a requirement that the defendant participate in an
appropriate substance abuse program.
Id. § 5H1.4. Likewise, “[m]ental and emotional conditions may be relevant in determining the
conditions of probation or supervised release, e.g., participation in a mental health program.” Id. §
5H1.3.
25. KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 56 (1998). See also Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical
Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L. REV. 557 (2003); Paul Hofer and Mark
Allenbaugh, Reconstructing the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Still Incoherent
After All these Years? 15 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER 211 (2003).
26. U.S.S.G., supra note 18, § 4H1.7 (emphasis added).
27. See discussion infra Part II.
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punishment are explicitly excluded from consideration in federal sentencing
procedures. While no rationale for this exclusion is forthcoming from the Act or
the Guidelines, the implicit concerns seem clear enough. Mark Moore is
representative of the commentators:
Some characteristics [used as risk factors for violence in
sentencing], such as prior criminal conduct and current illegal drug
use, are themselves crimes and therefore of direct interest to the
criminal justice system. Others, such as race, religion, and
political beliefs, are the opposite: they are specially protected
against being used by criminal justice officials in making
decisions. Some characteristics, such as prior crimes, drug use,
and perhaps employment, are thought to be under the control of the
offenders and therefore expressions of their inclinations and
values. Other characteristics, such as age or race, are not under the
control of the offenders and consequently are of little moral
significance: they cannot be expressions of a person’s character
although they might be good predictors of future conduct.28
Even if crime control is one of the primary purposes of criminal
punishment, therefore, concern with just deserts is sufficiently strong that it will

28. Mark H. Moore, PURBLIND JUSTICE: Normative Issues in the Use of Prediction in the
Criminal Justice System, in CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” 314, 317 (Alfred
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constrain the variables that can be used in the pursuit of crime control. Criminal
history can be relied upon, since, in the words of one of the reports that led to the
creation of the Sentencing Commission, “a record of prior offenses bears both on
the offender’s deserts and on the likelihood of recidivism.”29 But variables
reflecting characteristics of the defendant that have no “moral significance”
cannot be used to set sentence length in federal court, even if they have great
statistical significance in predicting recidivism, including violent recidivism.30

B. The civil commitment of people with mental disorder.

All states have statutes allowing certain people with a mental disorder to
be involuntarily hospitalized in a psychiatric facility.31 Prior to the late 1960s,

Blumstein et al. eds., 1986).
27. Andrew von Hirsch, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976) at 87.
30. At the state level, sentencing systems very greatly. As Michael Tonry has noted, “there is no
longer anything that can be called ‘the American system’ of sentencing and corrections.” M.
Tonry, The Fragmentation of Sentencing and Corrections in America, Research in Brief:
Sentencing and Corrections – Issues for the 21st Century (Office of Justice Programs, National
Institute of Justice, September 1999) at 1. A recent survey noted that 18 states have some form of
sentencing guidelines, and proposals for sentencing guidelines were pending in four additional
states. R. Lubitz and T. Ross, Sentencing Guidelines: Reflections for the Future, Research in
Brief: Sentencing and Corrections – Issues for the 21st Century (Office of Justice Programs,
National Institute of Justice, June 2001). These state guidelines, like the federal ones, “typically
reduce authorized sentencing criteria solely to the offender’s crime and to some measure of his or
her criminal history.” M. Tonry, Reconsidering Indeterminate and Structured Sentencing,
Research in Brief: Sentencing and Corrections – Issues for the 21st Century (Office of Justice
Programs, National Institute of Justice, September 1999).
31. See e.g., LAWRENCE GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 210 (2002):
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involuntary commitment to psychiatric hospitals was justified primarily by a
paternalistic concern for people who were seen to be "in need of treatment."
Beginning at that time, however, public safety began to dominate as a rationale
for commitment, and risk of harmful behavior—called "dangerousness" in statutes
and court decisions—became a primary focus of legal attention.32 Typically, to
qualify for involuntary civil commitment as a hospital inpatient, the individual has
to be “seriously mentally disordered,” and because of this serious disorder, to be
either “dangerous to others” or “dangerous to self.”33 While there was a flurry of
interest in the constitutionality of commitment statutes during the 1970s, the
United States Supreme Court left no doubt that such laws would be upheld,
provided that adequate procedural safeguards were in place, such as proof of
disorder and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.34
Advocates for family members of people with mental disorder have long
argued that these 1960s-era state civil commitment statutes were written so

Civil commitment is the detention (usually in a hospital or other specially designated
institution) for the purposes of care and treatment. Civil commitment, like isolation and
quarantine, is both a preventive measure designed to avert risk, and a rehabilitative
measure designed to benefit persons who are confined. Consequently, persons subject to
commitment usually are offered, and sometimes are required to submit to, medical
treatment. Civil commitment is normally understood to mean confinement of persons
with mental illness or mental retardation, but it is also used for containing persons with
infectious diseases, notably tuberculosis, for treatment.
32. See PAUL APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF
CHANGE (1994).
33. See generally, MICHAEL PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY (1994).
34. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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narrowly and with so many procedural protections that many people who need
mental health services but refuse to adhere to those services—refuse, according to
this view, because their disorder rendered them incompetent to make treatment
decisions35—were effectively left untreated. These advocates urged looser due
process protections and longer time limits on hospital treatment. For two decades,
a combination of civil libertarian and fiscal concerns thwarted moves in this
direction.36
In the past several years, however, the tide has turned in many states. This
development has less to do with an increase in legislative compassion for people
with mental disorder than with a shift in the lobbying tactics of the treatment
advocates. No longer appealing to humanitarian concerns, advocates of
reinvigorated commitment statutes have sold their approach to state legislatures
by playing on already exaggerated37 public fears of violence committed by people
with a mental disorder. As stated by one of the most visible figures in the
treatment advocacy movement,
Laws change for a single reason, in reaction to highly publicized incidents

35. THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT:
A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1998).
36. For an insightful history of these developments, see Paul Appelbaum, supra note __.
37. See Bernice Pescosolido et al., The Public's View of the Competence, Dangerousness and
Need for Legal Coercion Among Persons with Mental Illness. 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1339
(1999).
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of violence. People care about public safety. I am not saying it is right, I
am saying this is the reality. . . . So if you’re changing your [civil
commitment] laws in your state, you have to understand that. . . . It
means that you have to take the debate out of the mental health arena and
put it in the criminal justice/public safety arena.38
Examples of the new, less libertarian and more treatment-oriented
commitment statutes include South Dakota, which in 2000 extended the time
frame over which a violent act could be predicted to occur by deleting the word
“very” from the previous statutory language that had read “very near future.”39
Likewise, Minnesota in 200240 and Maryland in 200341 removed the requirement
that dangerousness be “imminent.” Wyoming in 1999 broadened the definition of
“dangerous to himself or others” to include not only “death” and “serious physical
injury,” but also “destabilization from lack of or refusal to take prescribed
psychotropic medications.”42 Similarly, in 2002, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld a statute authorizing the commitment of people with mental disorder who,

38. D. J. Jaffe, Speech to the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (onfile with author). See also
E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Why Deinstitutionalization Turned Deadly, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 1998, at A18 (“approximately 1,000 homicides a year are committed nationwide by
seriously mentally ill individuals who are not taking their medication.”).
39. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-1-1 (Michie 2001).
40. 2002 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 335 (West).
41. Maryland Senate Bill 273/House Bill 668 (enacted May 22, 2003; effective October 1, 2003).
42.WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-101(a)(ii) (Michie 2001).
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if left untreated, will lose their “ability to function independently in the
community.”43
More dramatic than the loosening of existing civil commitment statutes for
inpatient hospitalization has been the proliferation of new statutes allowing for
civil commitment to outpatient treatment for people with mental disorder.
Mandating adherence to mental health treatment in the community through
outpatient commitment has now become the most contested issue in mental health
law.44 Although 40 U.S. jurisdictions have statutes that nominally authorize
outpatient commitment, until recently few states made substantial use of these
laws.45 With the 1999 enactment in New York State of “Kendra’s Law,”46
nationwide interest in outpatient commitment (euphemistically termed “assisted
outpatient treatment” in the statute) has greatly increased. Kendra’s Law

43. State v. Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851 (Wis. 2002).
44. See John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient Commitment,
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1198 (2001); John Monahan, Marvin Swartz and Richard Bonnie,
Mandated Community Treatment for Mental Disorder. 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 28 (2003); Marvin
Swartz & John Monahan, Special Section on Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 52
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 323 (2001). There are three types of outpatient commitment. The first is
a variant of conditional release from a hospital: a patient is discharged on the condition that he or
she continues treatment in the community. The second type is an alternative to hospitalization for
people who meet the legal criteria for inpatient treatment: they are essentially given the choice
between receiving treatment in the community and receiving treatment in the hospital. The third
type of outpatient commitment is preventive: people who do not currently meet the legal criteria
for inpatient hospitalization but who are believed to be at risk of decompensation to the point that
they will qualify for hospitalization if left untreated are ordered to accept treatment in the
community. Joan Gerbasi, et al., Resource Document on Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 28 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 127-44 (2000).
45. Gerbasi et al., supra note 37.
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mandates adherence to mental health treatment in the community for a person
who meets a number of statutory qualifications, including suffering from mental
illness, and who, “because of mental illness is unlikely to participate voluntarily
in recommended treatment and . . . needs assisted outpatient treatment to prevent
a relapse or deterioration which would likely result in serious harm to the person
or others.” Kendra’s Law has withstood a number of constitutional challenges in
New York State courts47 and in February 2004 was unanimously upheld by the
New York Court of Appeals.48 Since it was enacted in late 1999, 9,323 people in
New York State have been evaluated for outpatient commitment under Kendra’s

46. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (Gould 2002).
47. See e.g., In re Urcuyo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 873 (2000):
Clearly, the state has a compelling interest in taking measures to prevent these patients
who pose such a high risk from becoming a danger to the community and themselves.
Kendra’s Law provides the means by which society does not have to sit idly by and
watch the cycle of decompensation, dangerousness and hospitalization continually repeat
itself.
See also Ilissa Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s Law: New York’s
Solution for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181(2001).
48. In the Matter of K.L. (Anonymous) v. Glenn Martin. 2004 NY Int. 14 (February 17, 2004):
[T]he assisted outpatient's right to refuse treatment is outweighed by the state's
compelling interests in both its police and parens patriae powers. Inasmuch as an AOT
[Assisted Outpatient Treatment] order requires a specific finding by clear and convincing
evidence that the patient is in need of assisted outpatient treatment in order to prevent a
relapse or deterioration which would be likely to result in serious harm to self or others,
the state's police power justifies the minimal restriction on the right to refuse treatment
inherent in an order that the patient comply as directed… In addition, the state's parens
patriae interest in providing care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves
because of mental illness is properly invoked since an AOT order requires findings that
the patient is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision…. Id at 10.
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Law, of whom 3,455 were committed and another 2,614 “voluntarily” agreed to
adhere to treatment in the community before a judgment was rendered.49
“Laura’s Law,” modeled on the New York statute, went into effect in California
on January 1, 2003.50 Florida amended its civil commitment statute to allow for
outpatient commitment, effective January 1, 2005.51

C. The commitment of sexually violent predators.

The most influential case dealing with violence risk assessment in
recent years has been the United States Supreme Court’s 1997 upholding
of sexually violent predator statutes in Kansas v. Hendricks.52 Under the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act,53 an offender, after being convicted
of a specified sexual crime and serving the prison sentence associated with
that criminal conviction, can be found to be a sexually violent predator.
This finding can serve as the predicate for civil commitment to a mental
hospital for an indefinite period. The Act defined a "sexually violent
predator" as “any person who has been convicted of or charged with a

49. http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/kendra_web/kstatus_rpts/statewide.htm (last visited
August 15, 2004).
50. The Outpatient Treatment Demonstration Act of 2002 (AB 1421).
51. Amendments to the Baker Act (S.700).
52. 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
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sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the
predatory acts of sexual violence.”54
Justice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 majority, made clear that it was pivotal
in the decision that the statute under review was civil in nature. “The
categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or criminal ‘is first of all a
question of statutory construction.’ We must initially ascertain whether the
legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings. If so, we ordinarily
defer to the legislature's stated intent.”55 He continued:
Here, Kansas' objective to create a civil proceeding is evidenced by its
placement of the Sexually Violent Predator Act within the Kansas probate
code, instead of the criminal code, as well as its description of the Act as
creating a "civil commitment procedure." Nothing on the face of the
statute suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other than a
civil commitment scheme designed to protect the public from harm.56

53. KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, art. 29A (2001)
54. Id. at § 59-29a02(a).
55. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (citation omitted).
56. Id.(citation omitted). Justice Thomas elaborated on why the statute in question was properly
categorized as civil rather than criminal:
[C]ommitment under the Act does not implicate either of the two primary objectives of
criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence. The Act's purpose is not retributive

20
Even Justice Breyer, dissenting in Hendricks, noted that “Civil
commitment of dangerous, mentally ill individuals by its very nature involves
confinement and incapacitation. Yet ‘civil commitment,’ from a constitutional
perspective, nonetheless remains civil.”57 Five years later, in Kansas v. Crane,58
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the view that, in sexually violent predator cases,
“the confinement at issue [is] civil, not criminal, confinement.”59
Sixteen states have now enacted sexually violent predator statutes
modeled on the Kansas law upheld in Hendricksand in Crane providing for the
post-imprisonment civil commitment of sex offenders who have a mental

because it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct. Instead, such conduct is
used solely for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate that a "mental abnormality"
exists or to support a finding of future dangerousness...Nor can it be said that the
legislature intended the Act to function as a deterrent. Those persons committed under the
Act are, by definition, suffering from a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder"
that prevents them from exercising adequate control over their behavior. Such persons are
therefore unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.
Id. at 361-62.
57. Id. at 380. See also Paul Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous
Blameless Offenders, 83 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1993); Stephen
Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, With
Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69 (1996).
58. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). See Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil
Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, STANFORD L. REV. 2229 (2003).
59. Id. at 868. The Court in Crane held that proof of a complete inability to control one’s
behavior was not a Constitutionally necessary prerequisite to being found to be a sexually violent
predator and civilly committed to a hospital.
It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.
And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric
diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to
distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist
convicted in an ordinary criminal case. Id. at 870.
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abnormality and are believed to be at high risk of violent recidivism.60 The latest
data indicate that across these 16 states 1,632 people have been adjudicated to be
sexually violent predators and are currently confined in psychiatric facilities, with
a further 846 people hospitalized for evaluation and currently awaiting trial for
commitment as a sexually violent predator. 58

PART II: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SCIENCE OF VIOLENCE
FORECASTING

In this Part, I first clarify a fundamental distinction, that between clinical
and actuarial approaches to risk assessment. I then briefly review several of the
actuarial violence risk assessment instruments that have recently become
available for use by expert witnesses. Finally, I consider in more detail ten risk
factors for violence that often appear on these actuarial instruments.

A. Clinical and actuarial approaches to risk.

There are two basic approaches to the risk assessment of violence, or of

60. W. Lawrence Fitch, Sex Offender Commitment in the United States: Legislative and Policy
Concerns, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT (New York
Academy of Sciences ed. 2003). See also Bruce Winick and John LaFond (Eds), PROTECTING
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY (2003).
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any other form of human behavior. One approach, called clinical prediction,
relies on the subjective judgment of experienced decision makers—typically, in
the case of violence, psychologists and psychiatrists, but also parole board
members or judges. The risk factors that are assessed in clinical prediction might
vary from case to case, depending on which seem more relevant. These risk
factors are then combined in an intuitive manner to generate an opinion about
violence risk. The other approach, termed actuarial (or statistical) prediction,
relies on explicit rules specifying which risk factors are to be measured, how
those risk factors are to be scored, and how the scores are to be mathematically
combined to yield an objective estimate of violence risk.62 Christopher Slobogin,

58

Id.

59. As stated by Barbara Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1421-22 (1979):
Techniques for predicting individual behavior generally use one of two competing
approaches to the problem. One approach relies on the subjective judgment of
experienced decision makers, who evaluate each applicant on an individual basis in light
of the experience accumulated by the decision maker and his profession.
The alternative method for making predictions evaluates each applicant
according to a predetermined rule for counting and weighting key characteristics. The
relevant characteristics are specified in advance, and so is the rule for combining them to
produce a score for each applicant. This score must be convertible into an estimate of the
applicant's expected performance. This method of making predictions is often called
statistical prediction, because statistical techniques are generally used to generate the rule
from an analysis of prior cases to measure the accuracy of the rule in describing those
prior cases, and to decide whether the rule should be used to predict results in future
cases.
62

As stated by Barbara Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1421-22 (1979):
Techniques for predicting individual behavior generally use one of two competing
approaches to the problem. One approach relies on the subjective judgment of
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writing almost 20 years ago, stated that “read in their best light the data suggest
that neither the clinical nor the actuarial method of prediction provides
information that will permit an accurate designation of a ‘high risk’ group whose
members have more than a forty to fifty percent chance of committing serious
assaultive behavior.”63
Recent research, reviewed below, confirms the continuing validity of
Professor Slobogin’s claim regarding clinical prediction, but indicates that his
conclusion regarding actuarial prediction has been superceded by the data.

Clinical Prediction

Neither the customary inpatient or outpatient forms of civil commitment—
nor civil commitment as a sexually violent predator—are predicated on the
assumption that all people with mental disorder or mental abnormality will be
violent. Rather, they are premised on the belief that behavioral scientists can

experienced decision makers, who evaluate each applicant on an individual basis in light
of the experience accumulated by the decision maker and his profession.
The alternative method for making predictions evaluates each applicant
according to a predetermined rule for counting and weighting key characteristics. The
relevant characteristics are specified in advance, and so is the rule for combining them to
produce a score for each applicant. This score must be convertible into an estimate of the
applicant's expected performance. This method of making predictions is often called
statistical prediction, because statistical techniques are generally used to generate the rule
from an analysis of prior cases to measure the accuracy of the rule in describing those
prior cases, and to decide whether the rule should be used to predict results in future
cases.
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distinguish with a reasonable degree of accuracy between those people with
mental disorder or abnormality who are “dangerous” and those who are not.
One early review of the research challenging this assumption about
the accuracy of clinical predictions of violence concluded that
“psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of
three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period among
institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the past
(and thus had high base rates for it) and who were diagnosed as mentally
ill.”64
Little has transpired in the intervening decades to increase confidence in
the ability of psychologists or psychiatrists, using their unstructured clinical
judgment, to accurately assess violence risk.65 Only two studies of the validity of
clinicians’ predictions of violence in the community have been published in the
past 20 years. One studied court-ordered pre-trial risk assessments and found that
39% of the defendants rated by clinicians as having a "medium" or "high"
likelihood of being violent to others were reported to have committed a violent act
during a two-year follow-up, compared to 26% of the defendants predicted to

63. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 126 (1984).
64. JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981).
65. See John Monahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of
Violence, in 1M ODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
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have a "low" likelihood of violence,66 a statistically significant difference, but one
small in absolute terms.
In the second study,67 the researchers took as their subjects male and
female patients being examined in the acute psychiatric emergency room of a
large civil hospital. Psychiatrists and nurses were asked to assess potential patient
violence to others over the next six-month period. Patients who elicited
professional concern regarding future violence were moderately more likely to be
violent after discharge (53%) than were patients who had not elicited such
concern (36%). In other words, of the patients predicted to be violent by the
clinicians, one-in-two later committed a violent act, while of the patients
predicted to be safe by the clinicians, one-in-three later committed a violent act.
Despite such modest scientific support, courts repeatedly have held that
clinical predictions of violence are sufficiently valid to be legally admissible as
scientific evidence.68

423-445 (D. Faigman et al., Eds.) (2d ed. 2002).
66. Diana S. Sepejak et al., Clinical Predictions of Dangerousness: Two Year Follow-up of 408
Pre-trial Forensic Cases, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171 (1983).
67. Charles Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1007 (1993).
68. See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary
Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV., 57, 901 (2000); MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 409-423 (D. Faigman et al., Eds.) (2d ed. 2002). As the
American Bar Association stated, courts rely on information in the form of clinical risk
assessments when making legal decisions "because courts are ultimately responsible for making
these decisions and though the information may remain open to challenge, it is the best
information available. The alternative is to deprive fact finders, judges and jurors of the guidance
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Actuarial Prediction

The general superiority of actuarial over clinical risk assessment in the
behavioral sciences has been known for half a century.69 William Grove and Paul
Meehl70 provide the most recent review. They located 136 empirical studies
comparing clinical and actuarial prediction and found them overwhelmingly to
support the superiority of the latter over the former (In only 8 of the 136 studies
was clinical prediction favored). Their conclusion: “We know of no social
science controversy for which the empirical studies are so numerous, varied, and
consistent as this one.”71
Unfortunately, the tools for implementing the knowledge that actuarial

and understanding that psychiatrists and psychologists can provide." AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL BENCHBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY 49 (1998). See also Erica Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge
of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845
(2003); Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony
and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353 (2003); Alexander Scherr, DAUBERT &
Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments. 55 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 1
(2003).

69. See PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954). See also John Swets et
al., Psychological Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions. 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1
(2000).
70. William Grove & Paul Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The ClinicalStatistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293 (1996). See also Dale McNiel et al,
Utility of Decision Support Tools for Assessing Acute Risk of Violence, 71 J. CONSULTING AND
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 945 (2003).
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prediction is generally more accurate than clinical prediction had never been
developed in the context of predicting violent behavior. In the past several years,
however, a number of violence risk assessment tools have become available, and
courts72 as well as legislatures73 have become remarkably receptive to their

71. Id. at 318.
72. Courts are increasingly approving of the use of actuarial instruments when a statute calls for an
assessment of violence risk. See, e.g., State v. Kienitz, 597 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1999) (Violence
Risk Appraisal Guide [VRAG] and Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20 [HCR-20]
admissible); Johnson v. Washington, No. 43434-9-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 994 (2001) (VRAG
admissible); Washington v. Strauss, 20 P.3d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (Minnesota Sex
Offender Screening Tool Revised [MnSOST-R], Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense
Recidivism [RRASOR], and VRAG admissible); In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (RRASOR, MnSOST-R, California Actuarial Risk Assessment Tables
[CARAT], and Registrant Risk Assessment Scale [RRAS] admissible); Pedroza v. Florida, 773
So. 2d. 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (RRASOR and MnSOST-R admissible); In re Detention of
Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (RRASOR and Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
[PCL-R] admissible); In re Detention of Dean, 2000 WL 690142 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (VRAG
and Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide [SORAG] admissible); State v. Barret, 2000 WL 566155
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (MnSOST-R admissible); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir.
2000) (PCL-R admissible); People v. Williams, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 2245 (2001); State v.
Watkins, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3858 (2001) (RRASOR admissible); Muhammad v. State, 46
S.W.3d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (PCL-R admissible); In re Shaw, No. P29560437, 1997 WL
243454 (Minn. Ct. App. May 13, 1997) (PCL-R admissible); In re Wilson, 2000 WL 1182807, *2,
*5 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2000) (referring to the PCL-R as one “used by many researchers to
classify an individual as a psychopath; PCL-R admissible); State v. Lauderdale, 1998 WL 906482,
at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1998) (PCL-R admissible); United States v. Doe, 113 F. Supp. 2d
604 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (PCL-R admissible); In re Detention of Thorell, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS
319 (2000) (SORAG and RRASOR admissible); State v. Bare, 2000 WI App. 31, 622 N.W.2d 769
(RRASOR and VRAG admissible); People v. Roberge, 2000 WL 1844791 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 15,
2000) (RRASOR admissible); In re Detention of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(RRASOR admissible); People v. Otto, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (RRASOR
admissible); State v. Wilson, 2000 WI App. 71, 610 N.W.2d 511 (RRASOR admissible); People
v. Poe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (RRASOR admissible); State v. Moore, No. CR049702, 2000 WL 1176870 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2000) (RRASOR; and MnSOST-R
admissible); State v. Morris, 2000 WL 1010822 (Ohio Ct. App. July 18, 2000) (RRASOR and
MnSOST-R admissible); In re Poole, 2000 WL 781381, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 2000)
(PCL-R admissible); People v. Turner, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 463 at n. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(PCL-R admissible); People v. Dacayana, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (PCL-R
admissible); State v. Watson, 595 N.W.2d 403, 410 (Wis. 1999) (PCL-R admissible); Smetana v.
State, 991 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (PCL-R admissible); In re Detention of Holtz, 653
N.W.2d 613 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (RRASOR, Static-99, and MnSOST-R admissible); Lee v.
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introduction in evidence. The promise of actuarial prediction of violence appears
finally to have arrived.74 Here, I will briefly describe three of the best-known
instruments.

State, 854 So.2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (RRASOR, MnSOST-R, PCL-R, SORAG, and
VRAG admissible) Cf State v Taylor, 335 Ill.App. 3d 965, 782 NE2d 920 (2002) (RRASOR,
Static-99, and MnSOST not admissible under Frye). See in general, Bernard Harcourt, From the
Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in
Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 99 (2003); Eric Janus and Robert Prentky,
Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: ACCURACY, ADMISSIBILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, __ AM CRIM L REV __ (in press).
73. Virginia became the sixteenth state to enact a sexually violent predator statute, and the first
state to incorporate actuarial risk assessment in such a statute, in April of 2003 (Chapter 989,
Virginia Acts of Assembly). The statute provides:
Each month, the Director [of the Department of Corrections] shall review the database of
prisoners incarcerated for sexually violent offenses and identify all such prisoners who
are scheduled for release from prison within 10 months from the date of such review who
receive a score of four or more on the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offender
Recidivism or a like score on a comparable, scientifically validated instrument as
designated by the Commissioner. § 37.1-70.4 (C).
The Rapid Risk Assessment of Sexual Offender Recidivism (RRASOR) is an actuarial instrument
consisting of four items: (1) number of prior sex offense convictions or charges (from 1 to 6 or
more), (2) age at release (more than 25 versus less than 25), (3) victim gender (only females
versus any males) and (4) relationship to victim (only related versus any non-related). The latter
items within the parentheses are scored higher than the former. A total score of 4 or more on the
RRASOR corresponds to a 10-year recidivism rate of 55 percent. R. Karl Hanson, The
Development of a Brief Actuarial Scale for Sexual Offense Recidivism (1997). See also R.Karl
Hanson and M. T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism
Studies. 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348(1998). As of October 2003, the Virginia
Attorney General had sought the civil commitment of 11 prisoners as sexually violent predators: 1
prisoner was committed, 1 case was dismissed, and 9 cases are still pending. 18 (19) VIRGINIA
LAWYERS WEEKLY 473 (Oct. 13, 2003).
74. Clinical judgment, however, is still necessary to review the risk estimates produced by
statistical prediction. According to one group of researchers, “actuarial instruments…are best
viewed as ‘tools’ for clinical assessment -- tools that support, rather than replace, the exercise of
clinical judgment. This reliance on clinical judgment -- aided by an empirical understanding of
risk factors for violence and their interactions -- reflects, and in our view should reflect, the
standard of care at this juncture in the field’s development.” John Monahan et al., RETHINKING
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(1) Violence Risk Appraisal Guide.

The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG)75 was developed from a
sample of over 600 men from a maximum-security hospital in Canada. All had
been charged with serious criminal offenses. Approximately fifty predictor
variables were coded from institutional files. The criterion measure used to
develop the instrument was any new criminal charge for a violent offense, or
return to the institution for a similar act, over a time at risk in the community that
averaged approximately seven years after discharge. A series of analyses
identified twelve variables for inclusion in the instrument.76 These twelve

RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 134 (2001)
[hereafter Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT].
75. Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders; The Development
of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315 (1993); see also Vernon
Quinsey et al., Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Recidivism, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 85
(1995); David Villeneuve & Vernon Quinsey, Predictors of General and Violent Recidivism
Among Mentally Disordered Inmates, 22 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 397 (1995); Marnie Rice &
Grant Harris, Violent Recidivism: Assessing Predictive Validity, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 737 (1995); Marnie Rice & Grant Harris, Cross-Validation and Extension of the
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231
(1997); Grant Harris & Marnie Rice, Risk Appraisal and Management of Violent Behavior, 48
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1168 (1997); Marnie Rice, Violent Offender Research and Implications
for the Criminal Justice System, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 414 (1997); Marnie Rice & Grant Harris,
The Treatment of Mentally Disordered Offenders, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 126 (1997). A
variant of the VRAG, for use specifically with sexual offenders, the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal
Guide (SORAG) has also been developed. VRAG and SORAG scores correlate highly, as would
be expected given the overlap in the risk factors. See Vernon Quinsey et al., VIOLENT
OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK (1998). For updates on studies using the
VRAG and the SORAG, see the website http://www.mhcva.on.ca/Research/ragreps.htm.
76. The variables were (1) score on the Psychopathy Checklist, (2) separation from parents under
age 16, (3) victim injury in index offense, (4) DSM–III schizophrenia, (5) never married, (6)
elementary school maladjustment, (7) female victim in index offense, (8) failure on prior
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variables were used to place patients into one of nine categories reflecting their
actuarial risk of future violence. In a recent prospective replication of this
research with 347 male forensic patients, 11 percent of the patients who scored in
category 1 on the VRAG were later found to commit a new violent act, compared
with 42 percent of the patients in category 5, and 100 percent of the patients in
category 9.77

(2) The HCR-20

The "HCR-20," which consists of 20 ratings addressing Historical,
Clinical, or Risk management variables,78 is a structured clinical guide that can be
scored in an actuarial manner to assess violence risk. In one study with prisoners,

conditional release, (9) property offense history, (10) age at index offense, (11) alcohol abuse
history, and (12) DSM—III personality disorder. For all variables except numbers 3, 4, 7, and 10
the nature of the relationship to subsequent violence was positive. (That is to say, subjects who
injured a victim in the index offense, who were diagnosed as schizophrenic, who chose a female
victim for the index offense, or who were older, were significantly less likely to be violent
recidivists than other subjects.)

77. Grant Harris et al., Prospective Replication of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide in Predicting
Violent Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 377 (2002).
78. The Historical items are (1) previous violence, (2) young age at first violent incident, (3)
relationship instability, (4) employment problems, (5) substance use problems, (6) major mental
illness, (7) psychopathy, (8) early maladjustment, (9) personality disorder, and (10) prior
supervision failure. The Clinical items are (11) lack of insight, (12) negative attitudes, (13) active
symptoms of major mental illness, (14) impulsivity, and (15) unresponsive to treatment. The Risk
Management items are (16) plans lack feasibility, (17) exposure to destabilizers, (18) lack of
personal support, (19) noncompliance with remediation attempts, and (20) stress. See Christopher
Webster et al., HCR-20: ASSESSING RISK FOR VIOLENCE (VERSION 2) (1995).
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researchers found that scores above the median on the HCR-20 increased the odds
of past violence and antisocial behavior by an average of four times.79 In another
study, the HCR-20 was completed for civilly committed patients who were
followed for approximately two years after discharge into the community. When
HCR-20 scores were divided into five categories, 11 percent of the patients
scoring in the lowest category were found to have committed or threatened a
physically violent act, compared to 40 percent of the patients in the middle
category and 75 percent of the patients in the highest category.80

(3) The Classification of Violent Risk.

The most recent development in this area is the creation of the first
violence risk assessment software, called the Classification of Violence Risk
(COVR®). This software was constructed from data generated in the MacArthur
Violence Risk Assessment Study.81 In this research, over 1,000 patients in acute

79. See Kevin Douglas & Christopher Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme:
Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3 (1999).
80. Kevin Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric patients: The HCR-20
Violence Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917, 925 (1999); Kevin Douglas et al, Evaluation of a
Model of Violence Risk Assessment Among Forensic Psychiatric Patients, 54 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1372 (2003).
81. Henry Steadman et al., A Classification Tree Approach to the Development of Actuarial
Violence Risk Assessment Tools, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2000); John Monahan et al.,

32
civil psychiatric facilities were assessed on 134 potential risk factors for violent
behavior. Patients were followed for 20 weeks in the community after discharge
from the hospital. Measures of violence to others included official police and
hospital records, patient self-report (under a Federal Confidentiality Certificate82),
and the report of a collateral (most often, a family member) who knew the patient
best in the community.
To develop a risk assessment instrument, the MacArthur Study relied on
“classification tree” methodology. This approach allows many different
combinations of risk factors to classify a person as high or low risk. Based on a
sequence established by the classification tree, a first question is asked of all
persons being assessed. Contingent on the answer to that question, one or another
second question is posed, and so on, until each person is classified by the tree into
a final “risk class.”83 Using only those risk factors commonly available in

Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing Violence Risk, 176 BRITISH J.
PSYCHIATRY 312 (2000); Eric Silver et al., Assessing Violence Risk Among Discharged
Psychiatric Patients: Toward an Ecological Approach, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 235 (1999); Paul
Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566 (2000); Thomas Grisso et al., Violent Thoughts and Violent
Behavior Following Hospitalization for Mental Disorder, 68 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 388 (2000); Steven Banks et al., A Multiple Models Approach to Violence Risk
). See
Assessment Among People with Mental Disorder, 31 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 324 (2004
generally John Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT.
82. Public Health Service Act §301(d), 42 U.S.C. §241(d)
83. This contrasts with the usual approach to actuarial risk assessment, such as the HCR-20 and
the VRAG, in which a common set of questions is asked of everyone being assessed and every
answer is weighted and summed to produce a score that can be used for purposes of
categorization.
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hospital records or capable of being routinely assessed in clinical practice,84 the
MacArthur researchers were able to place all patients into one of five risk classes
for which the prevalence of violence during the first 20 weeks following
discharge into the community was one percent in the lowest risk class and 76
percent in the highest.85

B. Common Actuarial Risk Factors for Violence

Each of these recently developed actuarial instruments has relied on a
different set of risk factors.86 But many risk factors are common to all or most of

84. The risk factors that emerged most often in the classification trees were the seriousness and
frequency of prior arrests, young age, male gender, being unemployed, the seriousness and
frequency of having been abused as a child, a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, whether the individual’s father used drugs or left the home before the
individual was 15 years old, substance abuse, lack of anger control, violent fantasies, loss of
consciousness, and involuntary legal status. Note that a diagnosis of schizophrenia was associated
with a lower risk of violence than other diagnoses (primarily depression and personality disorder).
See infra.
85. More specifically, the rates of violence in the community during the 20 weeks following
discharge for each of the five risk categories were 1%, 8%, 26%, 56%, and 76%, respectively.
Many more patients were in the lower than in the higher risk categories. For example, 37% of all
patients were in the lowest risk category (i.e, the category in which 1% of the patients were later
violent), and only 7% in the highest risk category (i.e., the category in which 76% of the patients
were later violent). See MONAHAN ET AL, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT (2001). Software to
administer this instrument, called the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) has been developed
and is currently undergoing prospective testing.
86. It is important to be clear on what a “risk factor” is and is not. To call A a risk factor for B
means two things and only two things. It means that (1) A statistically correlates with B, and (2) A
comes before B in time. A simple risk factor, in other words, is “a correlate that precedes the
outcome,” and nothing more. In particular, to call A a risk factor for B is not in any sense to imply
that A “caused” B. To make this latter assertion – to claim that A is what is referred to in
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the available instruments.87 These empirically valid risk factors might usefully be
organized into four categories: what the person is, what the person has, what the
person has done, and what has been done to the person. Here, I summarize what
is known about the ability of illustrative risk factors in each of these categories to
predict future violence.88

epidemiology as a “causal risk factor” for B – would require that two additional conditions be met.
It would require that (1) A is capable of changing, and (2) when A changes, B changes as well.
Helena Kraemer et al, Coming to Terms With the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 337 (1997). All of the items found on violence risk assessment instruments are
simple risk factors (if they were not risk factors – if they did not correlate with violence and were
not measured before violence was measured – they would not have been included in the
instrument). One often-raised question is whether in addition to being simple risk factors, the
items on actuarial risk assessment instruments are also causal risk factors. The answer is that
many, indeed most, of the simple risk factors found on violence risk assessment instruments could
not possibly be causal risk factors, if for no other reason than that they are incapable of changing
(e.g., gender, past violence). If one is interested primarily in preventing violence by targeting a
population of individuals at high risk of violence and incapacitating them until the high risk abates
(e.g., through treatment or through aging) – clearly the primary legislative intent behind both
police power civil commitment and civil sexual predator statutes – then relying on simple risk
factors is no more problematic, as a scientific matter, than relying on causal risk factors. Indeed,
relying on simple, non-changeable (and therefore non-causal) risk factors such as gender or age is
often affirmatively preferable to relying on causal risk factors for the simple reason that simple,
non-causal risk factors, being “fixed,” are usually easier than causal ones to measure reliably. Id.
87. With one exception – race or ethnicity – for reasons that will become clear, infra. In addition,
recall that the MacArthur Study relied on “classification tree” methodology, which allows
different combinations of risk factors to classify a person as high or low risk. The same risk factors
are not applied to each person. Rather, whether a given risk factor applies to a given individual
depends on which branch of the tree his or her previous responses have led. Scores on these risk
factors, therefore, cannot simply be summed to produce an estimate of risk.
88. For the prediction of sexual violence, see Marnie Rice & Grant Harris, The Scientific Status of
Research on Sexual Aggressors, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY 423-445 (D. Faigman et al., Eds.) (2d ed. 2002) (reviewing these
instruments). For the prediction of violence by offenders with mental disorder, see James Bonta et
al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A
Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123 (1998), who found risk factors for violence among
mentally disordered offenders to be remarkably similar to risk factors for violence among the
general offender population:
Criminal history, antisocial personality, substance abuse, and family dysfunction are
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Individual Risk Factors: What the Person “Is”

Four risk factors that frequently qualify for appearance on an actuarial
violence risk assessment instrument pertain to the fundamental characteristics that
make someone an “individual”: age, gender, race or ethnicity, and personality.
Each will be considered briefly in turn.89

(1) Age.
Few would dispute the conclusion that Robert Sampson and Janet
Lauritsen offered in their definitive review for the National Research Council’s
Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior: “Age is one of the
major individual-level correlates of violent offending. In general, arrests for

important for mentally disordered offenders as they are for general offenders. In fact, the
results support the theoretical perspective that the major correlates of crime are the same,
regardless of race, gender, class, and the presence or absence of mental illness. Id at 139.
89. It has become accepted in criminology to distinguish participation in violence—whether or
not a person engages in violence at all—from the frequency with which those who engage in
violence commit violent acts. CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” 1 (Alfred Blumstein
et al. eds., 1986). Risk factors for participating in violence need not be the same as risk factors for
committing violent acts at a high frequency. That is, risk factors for committing a first violent act
need not be the same as risk factors for violent recidivism. Demographic variables have been
found to be stronger risk factors for participating in violence than for violent recidivism. Id at 4.
Even for recidivism, however, demographic variables continue to be significant risk factors. For
example, the recidivism rate of robbery and assault is approximately twice as high among young
male offenders as among young female offenders. Id at 67. In the context of the civil commitment
of people with mental disorder, prior violence is not a prerequisite for a finding of “dangerous to
others,” and therefore data on the risk of a patient’s initial participation in violence are as relevant
to the commitment decision as data on the risk of a patient’s repeat violence.
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violent crime peak around age 18 and decline gradually thereafter.”90 Age is a
risk factor for crimes of sexual violence as well as violence more generally. For
example, a recent report from the Office of the Solicitor General of Canada asked
the question, “Does the risk of sexual offending decrease with age?” Ten studies
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, involving a total
sample of over 4,600 male sex offenders were reviewed. The answer to the
question was as follows:
On average, the rate of sexual recidivism decreased with age... For
rapists, the highest risk age period was between 18 and 25 years, with a
gradual decline in risk for each older age period. There were very few old
rapists (greater than age 60) and none were known to recidivate sexually.91
Age is also a risk factor for violence committed by people with mental
disorder. In the MacArthur Study of violence by people between eighteen and
forty years old who were in psychiatric facilities, for every one-year increase in a

90. Robert Sampson & Janet Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual,
Situational, and Community-Level Risk Factors, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 1, 18 (Albert Reiss & Jeffrey Roth eds., 1994).
91. R. Karl Hanson, Age and Sexual Recidivism, 6 CORRECTIONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (Solicitor General Canada, May 2001), at 1. The report notes that “the
patterns were different for rapists, extrafamilial child molesters, and intrafamilial child molesters
(incest offenders).” For example, extrafamilial child molesters were at their highest risk of
recidivism between the ages of 25 and 35, rather than the 18-25 year period at which rapists were
at highest risk of recidivism. Id. See also R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age; Follow-up Data
from 4,673 Sexual Offenders, 17 JOURNAL OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1046 (2002),
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patient’s age, the odds92 that the patient would commit a violent act within the
first several months after discharge decreased by twenty percent.93

(2) Gender.
That women commit violent acts at a much lower rate than men is a staple
in criminology, and has been known for as long as official records have been kept.
The earliest major review of this topic, by Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin,
concluded in 1974 that “The sex difference in aggression has been observed in all
cultures in which the relevant behavior has been observed. Boys are more
aggressive both physically and verbally... The sex difference is found as early as
social play begins – at age 2 or 2 1/2.”94 Another major review, by Robert
Sampson and Janet Lauritsen concluded in 1993: “Sex is one of the strongest
correlates of violent offending... males are far more likely than females to be
arrested for all crimes of violence including homicide, rape, robbery, and
assault.”95 Of the 434,391 persons arrested for a violent crime in the United

92. An odds ratio indicates the number of times the odds is increased for every unit change in the
risk factor. For example, if the odds ratio for the effect of male gender on violence is 2.0, then the
odds of violence for males are twice as great as the odds of violence for females.
93. Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT, at 163.
94. ELEANOR MACCOBY & CAROL JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 352 (1974).
95. Sampson and Lauritsen, supra n.___, at 19. See also Candice Kruttschnitt, Rosemary Gartner,
and Kathleen Ferraro, Women’s Involvement in Serious Interpersonal Violence, 7 AGGRESSION
AND V IOLENT BEHAVIOR 529 (2002).
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States in 2001, 359,116 (83 percent) were men and 75,275 (17 percent) were
women.96 While gender differences are sometimes lower for self report than for
official report,97 national crime survey findings closely parallel the arrest record
data: 14 percent of violent offenders were perceived by their victims to be
females.98 For violent offending that is explicitly sexual in nature, the gender
disparity is overwhelming: of the 18,576 people arrested for forcible rape in 2001,
18,356 were men (99 percent) and 220 (1 percent) were women.99 Of the 352
convicted offenders found to be violent sexual predators and currently civilly
committed in California mental hospitals, 351 are men and one is a woman.100

96. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L.
Pastore eds., 29th ed. 2001) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK], available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ (last visited August 15, 2004). Violent crimes include murder
and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Id. at 354, tbl. 4.8.
97. See D. Steffensmeier & E. Allan, Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory of Female
Offending, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 459 (1996).
98. See LAWRENCE GREENFELD & TRACY SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, WOMEN
OFFENDERS: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (1999).
99. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note __.

100. See Maura Dolan, Not Only Men are Molesters, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at A1.
Washington State also has only one woman among its 137 sexually violent predators. See
http://www.wa.gov/dshs/mediareleases/2001/pr01118.shtm. The Missouri Court of Appeals
recently ordered the discharge of the state’s only woman sexually violent predator. In the Matter
of the Care and Treatment of Angela M. Coffel, 2003 WL 716682 (Mo.App. E.D. (2003)). See
Todd Frankel, State’s Only Woman Sexual Predator Heads Home, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
November 5, 2003. Among people with serious mental disorder, the gender ratio in violence is
less pronounced than it is among the general population, but still very significant: in the
MacArthur Study, the odds that a patient who was a man would commit a violent act within
several months after discharge from the hospital were fifty-one percent higher than the odds that a
patient who was a woman would do so. Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT, at
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(3) Race.
Most of the research on race and violence has focused on differences
between whites and African Americans.101 African Americans accounted for 12
percent of the American population in 2001102 and for 38 percent of the people
arrested for violent crime.103 In a well-known study, Michael Hindelang
investigated the extent to which the over-representation of African Americans in
arrest statistics for violent crime was due to the differential involvement of
African Americans in violence or to the differential selection of African
Americans for arrest by the police.104 He compared FBI national arrest data with
data from the National Victimization Panel, a large-scale survey done in
conjunction with the United States Census Bureau that asks crime victims about
the perceived characteristics of their offenders. While some evidence of
differential selection was found, Hindelang concluded that the “data for rape,

163. See also Pamela Robbins, John Monahan, and Eric Silver. Mental Disorder and Violence:
The Moderating Role of Gender. 27 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 561 (2003).
101. As noted in the report of the PANEL ON THE UNDERSTANDING & CONTROL OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE (Albert
Reiss & Jeffrey Roth Eds., 1993), “Other minorities are also overrepresented among all arrestees
and among those arrested for violent crimes. Particularly striking is the relatively high
representation of American Indians and Alaska natives, especially for aggravated and other
assaults.” Id. at 71.
102. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, Population by Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin for the
Unites States (PHC-T-1).
103. See SOURCEBOOK,

supra note __ at Table 4.10

104. Michael Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Crimes, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 93 (1978). See also
VIOLENT CRIME: ASSESSING RACE AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES (Darnell Hawkins ed, 2003).
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robbery, and assault are generally consistent with official data and support the
differential involvement hypothesis.”105

(4) Personality.
A wide variety of components of what psychologists would call
“personality”106 and what the Federal Rules of Evidence refer to as “character”107
have been empirically linked to the commission of violent acts.108 For example,
one facet of personality that appears to be closely associated with violence is
anger and the individual’s ability to control its expression. According to
Raymond Novaco, the preeminent scholar in this area,

105. Id at 93. As expressed more recently and colloquially by Jesse Jackson: “There is nothing
more painful to me at this stage in my life than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start
thinking about robbery -- then look around and see somebody white and feel relieved." Quoted in
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Cabbies, Cops, Pizza Deliveries, and Racial Profiling, 32 NAT’L J. 1891, 1891
(2000). Among people with serious mental disorder, the racial ratio in violence is less pronounced,
but still significant: In the MacArthur Study, the odds that a patient who was African American
would commit a violent act within several months after discharge from the hospital were eightyfive percent higher than the odds that a patient who was white would do so. See Monahan et al.,
RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 163 (the standardized odds ratio reported in Monahan
et al. of 0.54 for being white is equivalent to a standardized odds ratio of 1.85 for being African
American (1.0/0.54 = 1.85)). Since the vast majority of this violence came from the patients’ own
self-report, official bias in arrest or hospitalization practices cannot account for this difference. See
Eric Silver, Race, Neighborhood Disadvantage, and Violence Among Persons with Mental
Disorders: The Importance of Contextual Measurement, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 449, 455
(2000).
103. E.g., Randy Larsen and David Buss, PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (2002).
104. Federal Rule of Evidence 404.
108. Blackburn R., Violence and Personality: Distinguishing Among Violent Offenders, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SERIOUS CRIMINAL RISK 109 ( D. Curran & W.G. McCartney
eds., 1999).
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One aspect of anger that influences the probability of aggression is its
degree of intensity. The higher the level of arousal, the stronger the
motivation for aggression, and the greater the likelihood that inhibitory
controls will be overridden. Strong arousal not only impels action, it
impairs cognitive processing of aggression-mitigating information. A
person in a state of high anger arousal is perceptually biased toward the
confirmation of threat, is less able to attend to threat-discounting elements
of the situation, and is not so capable of reappraising provocation cues as
benign.109

Clinical Risk Factors: What the Person “Has”

Three risk factors having to do with disorders with which a person can be
diagnosed pertain to a major mental disorder, a personality disorder, and a
substance abuse disorder.

(5) Major mental disorder.

109. Raymond Novaco, Anger, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 170, 171 (Alan Kazdin ed.,
2000). See also Dale McNiel et al, The Relationship Between Aggressive Attributional Style and
Violence by Psychiatric Patients, 71 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL 399 (2003). In the
MacArthur Study, a one standard deviation increase in his or her score on the Novaco Anger Scale
raised the odds that a patient would commit a violent act within several months after discharge by
fifty-two percent. See Monahan et al, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT, at 163. See also Dale
McNiel et al, The Relationship Between Aggressive Attributional Style and Violence by
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A large and growing body of epidemiological literature on major mental
disorder—schizophrenia, major depression, and bi-polar disorder—as a risk factor
for violence was summarized in the 2002 edition of Modern Scientific Evidence to
the following effect:
The data, which have only become available since 1990, fairly read,
suggest that whether the measure is the prevalence of violence among the
disordered or the prevalence of disorder among the violent, whether the
sample is people who are selected for treatment as inmates or patients in
institutions or people randomly chosen from the open community, and no
matter how many social and demographic factors are statistically taken
into account, there appears to be a greater-than-chance relationship
between mental disorder and violent behavior. Mental disorder may be a
statistically significant risk factor for the occurrence of violence.110
In terms of specific diagnoses, much clinical lore attests to the relationship
between a diagnosis of schizophrenia and the occurrence of violence. It is
important, however, to address the “compared to whom?” question. For example,
people with the diagnosis of schizophrenia may have a lower rate of violence than
people with other diagnoses, yet have a higher rate of violence than people with

Psychiatric Patients, 71 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 399 (2003).
110. Monahan, supra note ___.
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no diagnosis at all. Indeed, this is exactly what was found in the MacArthur
Study: 8.7 percent of the patients who had a diagnosis of schizophrenia
committed at least one violent act during the first ten weeks after discharge, a
figure lower than the 10.7 percent violence rate of the patients with a diagnosis of
major depression, but higher than the 4.6 percent violence rate of a comparison
group of people without mental disorder living in the same communities.111

(6) Personality Disorder.
A “personality disorder” is defined in the fourth edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV) as “an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and
leads to distress or impairment.”112 One condition generally considered to be a
personality disorder is “psychopathy” – a cluster of personality traits including
manipulativeness, lack of empathy, and impulsivity.113 Research on psychopathy

111. Data on file with author and also available at http://macarthur.virginia.edu.
112. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 629 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV].
113. Stephen Hart et al., Psychopathy As a Risk Marker for Violence: Development and Validation
of a Screening Version of the Revised Psychopathy Checklist, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL
DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds., 1994).
Psychopathy is not among the personality disorders listed in DSM-IV, however. Rather, the
related construct of “antisocial personality disorder” is included. In the MacArthur Study, the
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has been building considerable momentum over the past decade, with this
construct now considered by some to have an “unparalleled” ability to predict
future violence in criminal samples.114 Much of this work has been based on one
version or another of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare PCL-R).115
Studies suggest that the Hare PCL-R is a strong risk factor for violent recidivism
among non-disordered prison inmates116 and among mentally disordered
offenders.117 For example, Kevin Douglas and his colleagues118 assigned scores
on the Hare PCL to involuntarily civilly committed patients in the hospital and
assessed the measure’s ability to predict community violence over an average
two-year period. Following discharge, patients who scored at or above the Hare
PCL sample median were five times more likely to commit a physically violent

odds that a patient with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder on his or her chart would
commit a violent act within several months after discharge from the hospital were three times
higher than the odds that a patient without such a diagnosis would do so.
114.Randy Salekinet al., A Review and Meta-Analysis of the Psychopathy Checklist and
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised: Predictive Validity of Dangerousness, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI.
& PRAC. 203 (1996).
115. ROBERT HARE, THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED (1991).
116. See Stephen Hart et al., Performance of Psychopaths Following Conditional Release from
Prison. 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 227 (1988). But see John Edens et al.,
Psychopathy and the Death Penalty: Can the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Identify Offenders
Who Represent “a Continuing Threat to Society”?, 29 J. Psychiatry & L. 433 (2001).
117. See Kirk Heilbrun, et al., Inpatient and Post-Discharge Aggression in Mentally Disordered
Offenders: The Role of Psychopathy, 13 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 514 (1998).
118. Kevin Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The HCR-20
Violence Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917 (1999).
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act than those who scored below the median.119

(7) Substance abuse disorder.
Forty-one percent of all people serving a jail sentence in the United States
for the commission of a violent crime were drinking alcohol at the time they
committed the crime,120 and 36 percent were under the influence of illegal
drugs.121 In terms of a full-fledged DSM-IV substance abuse disorder, the most
careful estimate is that 29 percent of all male jail detainees, and 53 percent of all
female jail detainees could be so diagnosed, vastly higher than the prevalence of
this disorder in the general population.122 In their review for the National
Research Council’s Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior,
Klaus Miczek and colleagues stated “Alcohol is the drug that is most prevalent in
individuals committing violence... Experimental studies have repeatedly
demonstrated that alcohol causes an increase in aggressive behavior, in both

119

Apropos of this finding, in the MacArthur Study of civil psychiatric facilities, the odds that a
patient who scored high on psychopathy would commit a violent act within several months after
discharge from the hospital were four times higher than the odds that a patient who scored low
would do so. See Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 67.
120. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL OFFENDER
STATISTICS, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#alcohol (last visited August 15, 2004).
121. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG USE, TESTING, AND
TREATMENT IN JAILS, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/duttj.htm (last visited August 15,
2004).
122.GAINS Center Factsheet, The Prevalence of Co-Occurring Mental Illness and Substance Use
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animals and humans.”123 That there is a pharmacological relationship between
certain illegal drugs—notably cocaine and amphetamines—and violence is also
clear.124

Historical Risk Factors: What the Person “Has Done”

The principal risk factor for future violence to be found in an individual’s
life history is the extent to which he or she already has committed violent or other
criminal acts.

(8) Prior crime and violence.
The field of criminology has repeatedly demonstrated that prior violence
and criminality are strongly associated with future violence and criminality—

Disorders in Jails (Spring 2002).
123. Klaus Miczek et al., Alcohol, Drugs of Abuse, Aggression and Violence, in 3
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 377, 406 (Albert Reiss &
Jeffrey Roth eds., 1994). See also William Fals-Stewart, The Occurrence of Partner Physical
Aggression on Days of Alcohol Consumption: A Longitudinal Diary Study, 71 J. CONSULTING AND
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 41 (2003).
124. David Boyum and Mark Kleiman, Substance Abuse Policy from a Crime-Control
Perspective, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL 331, 334 (James Q. Wilson and Joan
Petersilia eds., 2002). In the MacArthur Study, the odds that a patient who had a DSM diagnosis
of alcohol or drug abuse or dependence would commit a violent act within several months after
discharge from the hospital were 2.7 times higher than the odds that a patient without such a
diagnosis would do so. 124. See Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 163.
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indeed no risk factor has been more thoroughly validated.125 Similar relationships
have been found specifically for persons with mental illnesses. For example,
presence of a juvenile or adult record has been found to be highly predictive of
adult violence among psychiatric patients. Measures of prior offending have
included the number of prior arrests for property crime, violent crime, or sexually
violent crime, number of prior convictions, number of prior incarcerations, and
patient self-reports of violent incidents.126

Experiential Risk Factors: What Has Been “Done To” the Person

Two kinds of experiences that an individual can have as a child have been
found to be risk factors for whether he or she acts violently as an adult: whether
the individual was raised in a pathological family environment, and whether the

125. See ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, A. ET AL., CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” (1986).
See also THOMAS GUTHEIL & PAUL APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 68 (3rd ed. 2000) (past violence “repeatedly appears as the strongest correlate in actuarial
studies of violence and related phenomena.”); Dale McNiel, Empirically Based Clinical
Evaluation and Management of the Potentially Violent Patient, in EMERGENCIES IN MENTAL
HEALTH PRACTICE: EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT, 95, 96 (Kleespies, P. ed., 1998). (“A
history of violence has been consistently shown to be the best single predictor of future violent
behavior.”).
126. Deidre Klassen & William O’Connor, Demographic and Case History Variables in Risk
Assessment, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, 10, 229
(J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds., 1994). In the MacArthur Study, the odds that a patient who had
recently committed a violent act would commit another violent act within several months after
discharge from the hospital were 2.3 times higher than the odds that a patient without recent
violence would do so. See Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 163.
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individual was physically abused.

(9) A pathological family environment.
That exposure to a pathological family environment as a child is a risk
factor for violence committed as an adult is a widely recognized tenet in
developmental psychology. As the National Research Council’s Panel on the
Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior concludes, “violent offenders
tend to have experienced poor parental childrearing methods, poor supervision,
and separations from their parents when they were children... [T]hey tend to have
alcoholic or criminal parents, and they tend to have disharmonious parents who
are likely to separate or divorce.”127
This association between pathological family environments in childhood
and later violence is as true of people with mental disorder as it is of people
without it. For example, an adult patient’s report that as a child his or her parents
fought with people outside the family is significantly associated with the patient’s
subsequent arrest and rehospitalization for violence.128

127. UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES (Albert Reiss & Jeffrey
Roth eds., 1994), at 367-68.
128. Deidre Klassen & William O’Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence in Adult
Male Mental Patients, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143 (1988). In the MacArthur Study, the odds that
a patient whose father had frequently used drugs during the patient's childhood would commit a
violent act within several months after discharge from the hospital were 2.4 times higher than the
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(10) Victimization.
Two types of studies exist regarding whether being abused as a child is a
risk factor for later violence. One type focuses specifically on subsequent
victimization of the children of the abused individual him or herself. The other
type looks more broadly to subsequent violence toward any victim, not
necessarily the abused individual’s own children.
Research on the effects of child abuse on later violent behavior toward
one’s own children was reviewed as follows:
The best estimate of intergenerational transmission [of violence] appears
to be 30% " 5%. This suggests that approximately one-third of all
individuals who were physically abused, sexually abused, or extremely
neglected will subject their offspring to one of these forms of
maltreatment, while the remaining two-thirds will provide adequate care
for their children… The rate of abuse among individuals with a history of
abuse… is approximately six times higher than the base rate for abuse in

odds than a patient whose father was not a drug-abuser would do so. The comparable figure for a
patient whose mother used drugs was fifty-four percent higher. Similar effects were obtained for a
patient’s father or mother having been arrested when the patient was a child. See Monahan et al.,
RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 163.
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the general population (5%).129
In terms of the effects of being victimized as a child on later crime in
general, Cathy Spatz Widom and Michael Maxfield recently reported data from a
large study that followed children processed by the courts for having been abused
or neglected, and a comparison group of children who had not been abused or
neglected. At the time of the follow-up, the subjects’ mean age was thirty-two
years.
Of primary interest was the question, “Would arrest histories of
those who had been abused or neglected be worse than those with
no reported abuse?” The answer [w]as evident: Those who had
been abused or neglected as children were more likely [than those
not abused or neglected] to be arrested as juveniles (27 percent
versus 17 percent), adults (42 percent versus 33 percent), and for
violent crime (18 percent versus 14 percent).130

PART III: DETERMINING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFICALLY

129. Joan Kaufman & Edward Zigler, Do Abused Children Become Abusive Parents?, 57 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 186, 190 (1987).
130. An Update on the “Cycle of Violence,” National Institute of Justice Research in Brief,
February 2001, at 3. In the MacArthur Study, the odds that a patient who had been seriously
physically abused as a child would commit a violent act within several months after discharge
from the hospital were 2.2 times higher than the odds that a patient who had not been so abused
would be violent. See Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 163.
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VALID RISK FACTORS FOR VIOLENCE

Items such as the ten described above are valid risk factors for the
occurrence of violence. Absent legal concerns, each would be a candidate for
inclusion on an actuarial violence risk assessment instrument. Legal concerns, of
course, are not absent. How is one to decide which scientifically valid risk factors
are admissible in court for assessing violence risk and which are not? The answer
will vary according to the legal context in which the violence risk assessment is
made, and according to the legal principles that govern decision making in each
context.

A. Criminal sentencing

The use of risk factors in sentencing must be constrained by the applicable
theory of criminal punishment. As we have seen, however,131 there is no coherent
theory of criminal punishment at the federal level. Rather, the official view is that
since both the backward-looking theory of punishment as just deserts and the
forward-looking theory of punishment as crime control will result in the same
sentences, there is no need to choose between the two rationales.
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This fundamental “philosophical problem,”132 which has vexed federal
sentencing since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and which vexes the statutes
of many states,133 need not be resolved in order to address the legitimacy of using
given violence risk factors in criminal sentencing, however. In practice, modern
sentencing is either purely retributive, or it is a mix of retributive and crimecontrol considerations. Retribution deeply colors the implementation of all
sentencing schemes, including those whose avowed goals include crime control.
That is to say, even in those states in which crime control is one of the
acknowledged purposes of criminal punishment, “the idea that personal and moral
autonomy are important values is still influential.”134 Just as the decision in
criminal law of whether to punish an individual at all is based on the
determination that he or she chose to commit the blameworthy act charged, so too
the decision of how much to punish an individual is in large part based on the
degree to which blame inheres in his or her actions. Given this state of affairs, the
use of violence risk factors in sentencing—including capital sentencing cases such
as Saldano—should properly be limited to those that index the extent or
seriousness of the defendant’s prior criminal conduct.

131. See text infra at___.
132. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (2000).
133. See supra note ___.
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It is a fundamental orthodoxy of our criminal justice system that
the punishment should fit the crime and the individual, not the
statistical history of the class of persons to which the defendant
belongs. To allow a criminal defendant’s sentence to be
determined to any degree by his unchosen membership in a given
[group] denies the very premise of self-determination upon which
our criminal justice system is built. It raises the threat that
defendants will be sentenced not on the basis of their personal
merit or conduct, but on the basis of their “status.”135
As Paul Robinson has put it, relying even on scientifically validated risk

134. Michael Tonry, The Fragmentation of Sentencing and Corrections in America, Research in
Brief: Sentencing and Corrections – Issues for the 21st Century (Office of Justice Programs,
National Institute of Justice, September 1999) at 5.
135. Daniel Goodman, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499, 521
(1987). See also Underwood, supra note ___, at 1416:
The conflict between prediction and respect for autonomy is most acute when the predicted
behavior is strongly and directly subject to individual control. For example, the act of
obeying or violating the criminal law is subject to individual control, and indeed that fact is
central to the structure of the criminal law. The strong tradition of respect for individual
autonomy in criminal law theory may account for a large measure of the resistance to
efforts to predict crime for purposes of sentencing and parole.
The issue of responsibility arises in other areas of the law that involve risk assessment. In the context
of insurance law, for example, Kenneth Abraham has stated:
Noncontrollable variables can be criticized on the ground that their use makes the exercise
of individual responsibility irrelevant to the price of insurance. No amount of care or
safety… can affect the cost of coverage when such variables distinguish risk classes. Thus,
the use of noncontrollable variables denies individuals the opportunity, through the exercise
of individual responsibility, to alter the effect of being “grouped.”
Kenneth Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71. VA L. REV. 403,
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factors for future violence that do not index blameworthiness “would be offensive
to a system of just punishment. A person does not deserve more punishment for
an offense because... he is young or has no father in his household.”136 Or, it
might be added in light of the above review, because of anything else a person is
(e.g., a gender), anything else a person has (e.g., a disorder), or anything else that
has been done to a person (e.g., being abused as a child). Blame attaches to what a
person has done. Past criminal behavior is the only scientifically valid risk factor
for violence that unambiguously implicates blameworthiness, and therefore the
only one that should enter the calculus of criminal sentencing.137

B. The civilcommitment of people with serious mental disorder.

While public health law shares with criminal law an interest in preventing
violence by incapacitating those at high risk of committing it, public health law
lacks the consideration of deterrence and retribution that define the criminal
sanction.138 Blameworthiness is central to criminal law, and irrelevant to public

437 (1985).
136. Robinson, supra note __, at 1440.
134. In some states, sentencing is based largely on retributive considerations, but parole has an
explicit crime-control focus. See JOHN MONAHAN AND LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed 2002) 369-374 for a discussion of risk factors found
admissible in state administrative parole hearings.
138. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361
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health law. As stated by Barbara Underwood, “When the predicted fact is not
subject to individual control, then predicting that fact is less threatening to the
value of respect for autonomy. For example, prediction of violent behavior by the
mentally ill…is seldom characterized as a threat to the autonomy of the mentally
ill.”139 Therefore, the use of violence risk factors in the civil commitment of
people with serious mental disorder to inpatient or outpatient treatment should—
with one significant exception—be unconstrained.
The sole constraint on the use of violence risk factors in civil commitment
should be a prohibition on those constitutionally suspect classifications whose use
the courts will subject to strict Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, which in this
context will be limited to race or ethnicity.140 Racial classifications, the Supreme
Court has stated, “must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest.”141 A number of circuit courts have
directly addressed the issue of risk factors in the context of denying parole,142 and

139. Underwood, supra note __ at 1415.
140. While strict scrutiny review also applies to national origin, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and to alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971), neither of these factors has been linked to violent behavior. Should national origin or
alienage be found to be a risk factor for violence, the same analysis employed here for race and
ethnicity would preclude their use in actuarial prediction schemes.
141. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
142. Block v Potter, 631 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1980); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868 (10th Cir.
1981); Thompson v Davis, 282 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2002); White v Bond, 720 F2d 1002 (8th Cir.
1983).
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all have held that using race as a risk factor for violence fails this test. It is
difficult to see how a racial classification that repeatedly has been held not to be
“narrowly tailored” for the purpose of decision making regarding parole from
prison could be found to be “narrowly tailored” for the purpose of decision
making regarding discharge from a mental hospital. The modest correlation
between race and violence143 is far from the “most exact connection”144 that the
Court has stated would be necessary to justify the inclusion of race as a risk factor
in effectuating these commitments.145
In this regard, race and gender are very differently situated, both
constitutionally and empirically. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the Court
noted that it consistently has subjected gender-based classifications to heightened
scrutiny “in recognition of the real danger that government policies that
professedly are based on reasonable considerations in fact may be reflective of
‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations about gender . . . or based on ‘outdated

143. In the MacArthur study, the correlation between race and violence was .12. Monahan et al.,
RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 163.
144. Adarand, supra note ___ at 236.
145. Excluding race as a predictor variable was, in fact, exactly what the researchers conducting
the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study did.
We eliminated one variable, race, from the final [risk assessment] models on ethical and
political grounds... In order to avoid any possible misinterpretation of our risk assessment
procedures as a form of “racial profiling,” we removed the variable of race... The revised
models without race differed only trivially in accuracy from the original ones which
included race.
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misconceptions . . . .’”146 In United States v. Virginia,147 the Courtmore
explicitly stated that, in reviewing classifications based on gender, the reviewing
court must determine whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly
persuasive." Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority that the State must show
"at least that the [challenged] classification serves 'important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.' The justification must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”148
The Court did not rule out all gender classifications, however, and
recognized that “the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both.”149
Tested against the considerations articulated in cases such as J. E. B. and
Virginia, classifying by gender for the purpose of violence risk assessment should
have no difficulty surviving Equal Protection challenge: the government’s police
power objective in preventing violence in society is surely “important,”150 and

Monahan et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSEMENT, at 119.
146. 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 506-507 (1975);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-199 (1976)).
147. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Internal citations omitted.
148. Id. at 533.
149. Id.
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including gender as a risk factor on an actuarial prediction instrument is
“substantially related” to the accuracy with which such an instrument can forecast
violence—and therefore assist in its prevention. Gender differences in violence
are genuine and not hypothesized, as the research reviewed in Part II
demonstrates. And while they may be archaic, they are not outdated: the same
gender difference found in the earliest published crime statistics (men made up 91
percent of homicide offenders in 13th century England)151 are found eighthundred
years later in the latest published crime statistics (men make up 88 percent of
homicide offenders in 21st century America).152
Apropos of Justice Ginsburg’s statement in United States v. Virginia,
Martin Daly and Margo Wilson recently have reported violence rates for “a
community made up exclusively of one” gender. They assembled data from 20
studies of homicides among unrelated people in which the offender and the victim
were of the same gender. The studies were done in the United States, Canada,
England, Mexico, Iceland, India, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Botswana, over

150. See O’Connor v Donaldson 422 US 563, 582 (1975) (“There can be little doubt that in the
exercise of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society from the
dangers of significant antisocial acts.”) (Berger, CJ, concurring); United States v Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, (1987) (“[T]he government may detain mentally unstable individuals who present a
danger to the public… [There is a] well-established authority of the government, in special
circumstances, to restrain individuals’ liberty prior to or even without criminal trial.”) Kansas v
Hendricks, supra, note ___, at 357 (“It …cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of
a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty.”)
151. James Given, SOCIETY AND HOMICIDE IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1977), at 134.
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periods ranging from the 1920s to the 1990s. Their results: male offender/male
victim homicides made up 98 percent of the total; female offender/female victim
homicides made up the remaining two percent.153 Regarding violence, it is hard
to gainsay the conclusion of Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi’s classic A
General Theory of Crime: “gender differences appear to be invariant over time
and space.”154
The remaining risk factors for violence—age, personality, major mental
disorder, personality disorder, substance abuse disorder, prior crime and violence,
a pathological family environment, and victimization—are subject to the lowest
level of judicial review.155 The research reviewed above demonstrates that there
is at least a rational basis for classifications based on these risk factors in order to
fulfill the police power goals of civil commitment statutes—goals that the
Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld.156

152. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2002), at Table 4.8 (arrests for murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter).
153. See Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Risk-Taking, Intrasexual Competition, and Homicide, 47
NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 1, 16 (2001).
154. Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME (1990), at 145. See
also Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, HOMICIDE (1988), at 146 (“The difference between the sexes
is immense, and it is universal. There is no known human society in which the level of lethal
violence among women even begins to approach that among men.”)
155. See Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness As a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in LAW,
MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 377 (B. Sales & D. Shuman eds., 1995) (“In short,
outside of race, if demographic characteristics improve the predictive process, they should be
used.”)
156. See supra note __,.
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C. The commitment of sexually violent predators.

There remains the difficult question of whether the use of violence risk
factors in the civil commitment of sexually violent predators should be
constrained to those that index the individual’s prior criminal history—as in
criminal sentencing—or should be unconstrained save for the use of race or
ethnicity—as in traditional civil commitment.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court clearly held in Hendricks and Crane
that sexually violent predator statutes were civil in nature, suggesting that the
same violence risk factors allowed in traditional civil commitment are permissible
to use in the commitment of sexually violent predators. On the other hand, almost
all legal and behavioral science commentators view Hendricks and Craneas
improperly decided.157 For the commentators, the “civil” designation of the

157. E.g., Stephen Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
250 (1998); Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J. LAW,
MEDICINE & ETHICS 56 (2004); Mara Krongard, A Population at Risk: Civil Commitment of
Substance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 CAL. L. REV. 111 (2002); Laura Barnickol,
Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: Treatment or Punishment?, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
321 (2000); Sarah Spierling, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How Washington’s Violent
Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance Between Punishment and Prevention, 9 J.L.
& POL’Y 879 (2001); Adam Hirtz, Lock ‘Em Up and Throw Away the Key: Supreme Court
Upholds Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 545
(1998); Kimberly Dorsett, Kansas v. Hendricks: Marking the Beginning of a Dangerous New Era
in Civil Commitment, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 113 (1998); Adam Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness
and Criminal Responsibility: The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment after Kansas v.
Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 117 (1999) Grant Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting
Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199 (2000); Lawrence Fitch & Richard Ortega,
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sexually violent predator statute at issue in Hendricks and Cranewas a legislative
pretext to circumvent constitutional concerns regarding double jeopardy and the
ex post facto application of law.
Hostility by commentators to the unconstrained use of non-suspect
violence risk factors in sexual predator commitments can be understood in large
part as hostility to—and an attempt to undermine the operation of—the Hendricks
and Cranedecision s themselves. To prohibit the state in sexual predator
commitments from using the very risk factors that scientifically permit high-risk
classifications to be validly made would accomplish via evidentiary means the
evisceration of statutes that commentators find substantively objectionable.
An alternative approach, endorsed here, is to keep separate evidentiary and
substantive concerns. If commitment as a sexually violent predator is truly a civil
commitment—as the Supreme Court holds it to be—then the evidentiary use of
violence risk factors in such statutes should parallel the use of violence risk
factors in traditional civil commitment—any valid risk factor except race or
ethnicity is a candidate for inclusion on an actuarial risk assessment instrument.158

Law and the Confinement of Psychopaths, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 663 (2000); Lisa Kavanaugh,
Massachusetts’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Legislation: Can Juries Make a Bad Law Better, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 509 (2000); Peter Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: State’s Civil
Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v Crane. 55 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 2229
(2003). Cf, Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1 (2003).
158. By the same logic, risk assessments of violence for the purpose of committing to a hospital
persons acquitted of crime by reason of insanity would also be unconstrained in their use of valid
risk factors, with the exception of race, since blameworthiness plays no part in the judgment. See

62
If, on the other hand, a state Supreme Court, hearing the commentators, found that
under the state’s constitution sexually violent predator commitments were only
pretextually civil, and actually function more as a form of extended criminal
punishment, then the use of any violence risk factors in such commitments would
be moot: the statutes would clearly violate the double jeopardy clause by
punishing the offender twice for the same conduct.159

PART IV: CONCLUSION

In the past, courts rarely have had to confront the admissibility of specific
risk factors for violence, because actuarial instruments with scientific validity in
assessing violence risk did not exist. Now, such instruments do exist and are
being used with increasing frequency in criminal sentencing, the civil
commitment of people with serious mental disorder, and the civil commitment of
sexually violent predators. Among the empirically valid risk factors that are
candidates for inclusion on these instruments are those that pertain to what the
person is (age, gender, race/ethnicity, and personality), what the person has

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (In the commitment of insanity acquittees, “the State
has no . . . punitive interest. As Foucha was not convicted, he may not be punished. Here,
Louisiana has by reason of his acquittal exempted Foucha from criminal responsibility.”).
159. Depending on whether the violent predator statute was enacted after the crime for which the
offender was originally sentenced, the statute may be unconstitutional for ex post facto reasons as
well.
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(major mental disorder, personality disorder, and substance abuse disorder), what
the person has done (prior crime and violence), and what has been done to the
person (being raised in a pathological family environment and being physically
victimized). Confronting the admissibility of these risk factors can no longer be
avoided: their presence on actuarial prediction instruments makes their use
transparent.
In making these unavoidable decisions about admissibility, I argue that
courts first should categorize appropriately the legal context in which each form
of violence risk assessment is made, and then apply accepted legal principles that
govern decision making in that context. In criminal law, with its emphasis on
blameworthiness for actions taken, these principles dictate that the admissibility
of scientifically valid risk factors in sentencing, including capital sentencing in
cases such as Victor Saldano’s, is properly constrained to those factors that
simultaneously index moral blameworthiness, i.e., to the defendant’s prior
criminal conduct. In mental health law authorizing the civil commitment of
people with serious mental disorder to inpatient or outpatient treatment—a legal
determination in which moral blameworthiness plays no part—the admissibility
of violence risk factors should be unconstrained, except for the use of
classifications subject to strict Equal Protection scrutiny, which in the case of
violence risk assessment is limited to the individual’s race or ethnicity.
Finally, in the commitment of sexually violent predators, I argue that
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courts should keep evidentiary issues about the admissibility of violence risk
factors apart from substantive questions about the constitutionality of the statutes
that trigger risk assessment. If commitment as a sexually violent predator is
properly categorized as civil commitment, the admissibility of violence risk
factors in implementing such commitments should parallel the admissibility of
violence risk factors in traditional civil commitment. Disagreement with the
substantive merits of sexually violent predator statutes does not justify depriving
decision makers of the only kind of scientific evidence—empirically-validated
actuarial violence risk assessment—that can effectuate their statutory goals.

